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Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) coro-navirus (MERS-CoV) represents 1 of 3 major 
zoonotic coronaviruses to have emerged with global 
impact in the past 2 decades, alongside severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-1) in 
2002–2003 and severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) from 2019 onward (1). 
The earliest known outbreak of MERS-CoV began in 
a hospital in Zarqa, Jordan, in April 2012 (2,3). Since 
that time, >2,500 cases and 880 deaths (case-fatality 
rate of 34%) have been reported across 27 countries 
worldwide (4). The fi rst detection of positive MERS-
CoV by serologic testing in camels was also from Zar-
qa, Jordan, in 2013 (5); camels were later confi rmed as 
the reservoir for MERS-CoV infection in humans (6) 
and bats the likely ancestral host (7).
Most confi rmed MERS-CoV cases have occurred 
within the Arabian Peninsula; Saudi Arabia, the lo-
cation of ≈80% of all human cases, is the epicenter 
(8). Phylogenetic analyses of viral sequences isolated 
from camels and humans suggest that multiple cam-
el-to-human spillover events have occurred since the 
initial MERS outbreaks in 2012 (9). Although humans 
sometimes represent a dead-end host, secondary hu-
man-to-human infection does occur, leading in some 
cases to large-scale outbreaks in hospital settings, 
such as those seen in Saudi Arabia and South Korea 
in recent years (10,11). Whereas infection in camels 
might be subclinical or cause mild upper respirato-
ry symptoms (12,13), infection in humans can range 
from asymptomatic to severe acute respiratory dis-
ease or death (14).
The World Health Organization has declared 
MERS-CoV a priority disease in its Research and De-
velopment Blueprint program as a public health risk 
of epidemic potential (15); vaccination of camels is 
a potential key component of future disease control 
strategies (16). Although MERS-CoV is widespread 
among camel populations in Africa, the Middle East, 
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After	 the	 fi	rst	 detection	 of	Middle	East	 respiratory	 syn-
drome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in camels in Jordan in 
2013,	we	conducted	2	consecutive	surveys	in	2014–2015	
and	2017–2018	investigating	risk	factors	for	MERS-CoV	
infection among camel populations in southern Jordan. 
Multivariate analysis to control for confounding demon-
strated that borrowing of camels, particularly males, for 
breeding purposes was associated with increased MERS-
CoV seroprevalence among receiving herds, suggesting 
a potential route of viral transmission between herds. In-
creasing age, herd size, and use of water troughs within 
herds were also associated with increased seropreva-
lence. Closed herd management practices were found 
to be protective. Future vaccination strategies among 
camel populations in Jordan could potentially prioritize 
breeding males, which are likely to be shared between 
herds. In addition, targeted management interventions 
with the potential to reduce transmission between herds 
should be considered; voluntary closed herd schemes of-
fer a possible route to achieving disease-free herds.
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and South Asia, its epidemiology within these popu-
lations remains poorly understood, particularly with 
regard to viral transmission routes and risk factors 
for infection (17). Such knowledge is urgently needed 
if camel vaccines currently in development are to be 
deployed effectively (18–21) and if management in-
terventions with the potential to contribute to disease 
control are to be identified. We addressed these key 
knowledge gaps through 2 large-scale, consecutive 
epidemiologic surveys among camel populations in 
southern Jordan, close to the border of Saudi Arabia.
Methods
Study Design and Study Population
We conducted 2 distinct studies during February 
2014–December 2015 and October 2017–October 2018. 
Both studies were conducted in Aqaba and Ma’an 
governorates of southern Jordan, an area with ≈8,000 
camels (according to Jordanian Ministry of Agricul-
ture [MoA] data) and 550 km of desert border with 
Saudi Arabia to the south and east (Figure 1).
In the 2014–2015 study, because of the absence 
of an adequate sampling frame, we conducted non-
probabilistic sampling among clients of a centrally 
located private veterinary practice in Al Quwayrah 
(Aqaba governorate). During the study period, the Al 
Quwayrah clinic closed (February 2015); the final 53 
herds included in the study were recruited through 
local contacts of government veterinarians working 
in the study area. We collected serum samples from 
the onset, whereas collection of nasal swab specimens 
began in March 2015 and occurred in the final 53 
herds only.
In the 2017–2018 study, we conducted multistage 
cross-sectional random sampling by using MoA-
supplied lists of camel owners for Aqaba and Ma’an 
governorates organized by 4 local administrative ar-
eas (Aqaba East, Aqaba West, Ma’an East, and Ma’an 
West). We collected serum samples and nasal swab 
specimens from the onset.
In both studies, to encourage owner compliance, 
we sampled <12 camels per herd; in herds of <12, we 
sampled all camels, subject to accessibility and owner 
permissions. A structured questionnaire regarding 
potential risk factors for MERS-CoV infection was 
administered in the local dialect on paper (2014–2015 
study) or on Android tablets using the application 
Open Data Kit (2017–2018 study) (https://getodk.
org) to herd owners face-to-face at the time of sam-
pling or by telephone after sampling. A veterinary 
surgeon clinically examined all camels included in 
the study to assess general health before sampling.
Sample Storage and Laboratory Methods
Blood samples were collected in 8 mL serum vacutain-
er tubes and centrifuged at 2,000 RPM for 10 min, fol-
lowed by serum collection and storage at −20°C. Nasal 
swab specimens were placed in viral transport me-
dium and chilled before storage at −20°C (2014–2015 
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study) or −80°C (2017–2018 study). All laboratory test-
ing of samples was performed at the Diagnostic Labo-
ratory, Veterinary Health Centre, Jordan University of 
Science and Technology (Irbid, Jordan).
ELISA
We tested serum samples in duplicate by using a 
MERS-CoV spike protein ELISA as previously de-
scribed by van Doremalen et al. (22). In brief, maxi-
sorp plates were coated overnight with S1 protein 
(Sino Biological, https://www.sinobiological.com) 
before blocking with 1% milk. MERS-CoV S1-spe-
cific antibodies were detected by using anti-llama 
IgG horseradish peroxidase-conjugated antibodies 
(Agrisera, https://www.agrisera.com) and subse-
quently developed with peroxidase-substrate reagent 
(KPL). Optical densities were measured at 405 nm 
and positivity at 3 times mean negative camel serum 
samples collected from United States–bred drom-
edary camels confirmed to be MERS-CoV–free. This 
assay does not cross-react with antibodies to bovine 
coronavirus, OC43, or SARS-CoV-1 (23).
Viral RNA Extraction and MERS-CoV Detection
RNA was extracted from nasal swab specimens by 
using the QiaAmp Viral RNA kit (QIAGEN, https://
www.qiagen.com) according to the manufacturer’s 
instructions <18 months after sample collection. Ex-
tracted RNA was used in a 1-step real-time reverse 
transcription PCR (rRT-PCR) UpE MERS-CoV assay 
performed on a QIAGEN Rotor-Gene instrument, 
with positivity set at a cycle threshold value of <40, 
on the basis of standard operating procedures as de-
scribed in Corman et al. (24).
Statistical Analysis
In each study, we separately calculated seropreva-
lence estimates weighted according to sample size 
relative to the estimated camel population (based 
on MoA data) and ran regression models for identi-
fication of risk factors. Because of the differences in 
sampling strategy, weighting was conducted by re-
gion for the 2014–2015 study and by subregion for the 
2017–2018 study. In both studies, we excluded camels 
<6 months of age from analyses because of the poten-
tial influences of maternally derived immunity.
We conducted univariate analyses by using 
mixed-effects regression with herd as a random effect 
and camel serologic status considered a binary out-
come. All potential risk factors were analyzed as cate-
gorical variables, with the exception of camel age and 
herd size, which were analyzed as continuous vari-
ables. Variables were herd level with the exception of 
age, sex, racing camel, and nasal discharge. For the 
2017–2018 study (data were missing in the 2014–2015 
study), we constructed a composite variable “closed 
herd,” which we defined as herds in which no bor-
rowing, lending, purchasing, racing, or contact with 
local or distant herds occurred.
We considered variables with a p value of <0.2 for 
inclusion in the multivariate models, with the excep-
tion of any variables missing >10% of their values. We 
used the Pearson R coefficient and a threshold of 0.4 
to compare collinearities between variables; we ex-
cluded colinear variables from the same multivariate 
model and tested in separate models. We conducted 
multivariate models by using mixed-effects regres-
sion with herd as a random effect and constructed 
using a backward stepwise method, removing the 
least significant variable at each step while p>0.1, 
unless the variable was considered an a priori factor 
(region, sex, and age) or the removal of the variable 
demonstrated a significant effect on the other vari-
ables (a change in log odds of >10%). We repeated 
model creation by using a forward stepwise method, 
beginning with a priori variables and adding new 
variables in order of significance, keeping variables if 
they showed significance of p<0.1 or changed the log 
odds of other risk factors by >10%. We performed all 
statistical analyses in R version 3.5.1 (https://cran.r-
project.org) and generated mixed-effects models by 
using the glmer function of the R package lme4 ver-
sion 1.1–21.
Ethics Statement
Informed consent was obtained from all participating 
camel owners at the time of sampling, and institution-
al and national guidelines for care, use, and handling 
of animals were followed at all times. Studies were 
conducted with institutional review board approval 
by the Royal Veterinary College and London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and Jordan Uni-
versity of Science and Technology and MoA.
Results
Study Results for 2014–2015
For 2014–2015, we included 433 camels with a medi-
an age of 6 years (interquartile range [IQR] 3–9 years) 
representing 97 herds (median herd size 11 [IQR 
5–22]). We obtained blood samples from an average of 
4.5 camels/herd and collected nasal swab specimens 
from 65% of included camels. The questionnaire was 
completed for 93 of 97 herds; we excluded 4 herds 
(17 camels) that lacked questionnaire data from the 
	 Emerging	Infectious	Diseases	•	www.cdc.gov/eid	•	Vol.	27,	No.	9,	September	2021	 2303
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analysis of risk factors. A total of 21 questionnaires 
were completed at the time of sampling, and 72 were 
completed subsequently by telephone.
In total, 128 sampled camels (from 22 herds) were 
from Ma’an region and 305 (from 75 herds) were from 
Aqaba region. MoA records indicated an estimated 
population of 4,436 camels (317 herds) in Ma’an re-
gion and 3,314 camels (265 herds) in Aqaba region; 
we weighted adjusted seroprevalence accordingly. Of 
433 camels sampled, 381 were seropositive for MERS-
CoV, an unadjusted seroprevalence of 88.0% and ad-
justed seroprevalence of 86.8% (95% CI 82.8–90.3). 
Of these, 9 camels were <6 months of age, of which 
4 were seropositive (44.4%). After we excluded these 
calves from the dataset, the adjusted seroprevalence 
was 88.0% (95% CI 84.1–91.4). No nasal swab speci-
mens tested positive for MERS-CoV RNA on rRT-
PCR.
Of 97 herds sampled, 93 had >1 seropositive 
camel (including calves <6 months of age), result-
ing in an unadjusted herd-level seroprevalence of 
95.9% and adjusted herd-level seroprevalence of 
92.3% (95% CI 83.3–97.1); median herd sample se-
roprevalence was 100% (IQR 80%–100%) (Figures 2, 
3). Highest weight-adjusted seasonal seroprevalence 
was in summer (93%) and lowest was in fall (84%); 
winter and spring results were both 88%.
In univariate analysis, age, sex, herd size, num-
ber of herds nearby, quarantine >3 days after pur-
chase, borrowing of breeding males, and water 
source were all found to be associated with seroposi-
tivity at p<0.2, although we identified no significant 
correlations for these variables (Table 1, https://
wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/27/9/20-3508-T1.
htm; Table 2; Figures 4, 5). Quarantine was exclud-
ed from the multivariate models because of a high 
number of missing values (62%). 
Variables in the final multivariate model results 
were age, herd size, borrowing of males for breeding 
purposes, and water source (Table 3). We noted evi-
dence of an association between camel seropositivity 
and borrowing of males for breeding purposes (ad-
justed OR [aOR] 4.18 (95% CI 1.45–12.09); p = 0.01), 
age per year (aOR 1.24 [95% CI 1.08–1.42]; p<0.01), 
and herd size per additional camel (aOR 1.04 [95% CI 
1.01–1.08]; p = 0.02).
Study Results for 2017–2018 
Blood samples and nasal swab specimens were col-
lected from 404 camels (median age 5 years [IQR 3–8 
years]) in 121 herds; an average of 3.3 camels were 
sampled per herd (median herd size 9 [IQR 4–17]). 
The questionnaire was administered to all 121 herd 
owners; 114 questionnaires were completed at the 
time of sampling, and 7 were completed subsequent-
ly by telephone. In total, 90 camels (29 herds) were 
sampled from Ma’an East, 70 (21 herds) Ma’an West, 
152 camels (36 herds) from Aqaba East, and 92 (35 
herds) from Aqaba West. MoA records described an 
estimated 1,909 camels (138 herds) in Aqaba East, 
1,405 camels (127 herds) in Aqaba West, 3,563 cam-
els (198 herds) in Ma’an East, and 873 camels (119 
herds) in Ma’an West; we weighted adjusted serop-
revalence accordingly.
Of 404 camels sampled, 264 were seropositive 
for MERS-CoV, for an unadjusted seroprevalence of 
65.3% and an adjusted seroprevalence of 70.2% (95% 
CI 65.6–74.7). Of these, 26 of 39 camels <6 months of 
age were seropositive (66.7%), which compares with 
18 (22.8%) of 79 among camels >6 months–2 years of 
age (OR 20.8 [95% CI 4.8–226.3]; p<0.01). After re-
moval of calves <6 months from the dataset, the ad-
justed seroprevalence was 70.2% (95% CI 65.0–75.2) 
among 119 herds.
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Figure 2. Frequency distribution of camels sampled for Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in southern Jordan, February 
2014–December	2015	and	October	2017–October	2018,	stratified	by	age.	A)	2014–2015	study;	B)	2017–2018	study.
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Of 119 herds sampled, 92 had >1 seropositive 
camel (including calves <6 months of age), result-
ing in an unadjusted herd-level seroprevalence of 
77.3% and adjusted herd-level seroprevalence of 
77.0% (95% CI 69.8–83.0); median herd sample se-
roprevalence was 75% (IQR 25%–100%) (Figures 2, 
3). The highest weight-adjusted seasonal seropreva-
lence was in spring (75%) and the lowest in win-
ter (63%); seroprevalence in fall was 70% (because 
of logistical constraints, no samples were collected 
during the summer).
No nasal swab specimens tested positive for 
MERS-CoV RNA on rRT-PCR. Nasal discharge was 
noted in 8 camels (2.6% [95% CI 1.4%–4.8%]) at the 
time of sampling (ages 3, 5, 6, 7, 7, 12, 14 and 15 years).
In the univariate analysis, the following 12 vari-
ables were found to be associated with seroposi-
tivity at p<0.2: region, age, sex, herd size, number 
of herds nearby, herd being kept as a single group 
throughout the year, contact with local herds, bor-
rowing of camels for breeding purposes, lending of 
camels for breeding purposes, use of camels for rac-
ing, water source, and closed herd status (Tables 1, 
2; Figures 4, 5). We identified correlations between 
contact with local herds and lending for breeding 
purposes (Pearson R coefficient = 0.46) and between 
borrowing for breeding purposes and lending for 
breeding purposes (Pearson R coefficient = 0.46).
Variables in the final multivariate model re-









OR	(95%	CI) p value OR	(95%	CI) p value 
Region      
 Aqaba Referent 0.53  Referent 0.01 
 Ma’an 0.68	(0.18–2.30)   3.95	(1.42–12.85)  
Age, per y†  1.22	(1.08–1.39) <0.01  1.63	(1.39–2.01) <0.01 
Sex†        
 F 2.48	(0.90–6.70) 0.07  3.02	(1.28–7.09) 0.01 
Herd size      
 Per individual no. camels 1.05 (1.01–1.09) 0.01  1.02 (1.00–1.04) 0.08 
No. camel herds within a 15 min drive      
 >20 2.42	(0.72–9.07) 0.16  2.24	(0.70–7.86) 0.18 
Herd kept together as single group throughout the year  0.84	(0.13–5.04) 0.85  2.88	(1.04–8.93) 0.05 
Herd has contact with other local herds  1.43	(0.30–6.64) 0.63  2.97 (1.07–9.17) 0.04 
Herd has contact with distant herds  0.55	(0.13–2.00) 0.36  1.86	(0.67–5.34) 0.23 
New camels are purchased‡ 0.77 (0.19–2.94) 0.70  1.51	(0.53–4.71) 0.44 
 Quarantine	>3	d	after	purchase	before	joining	herd 0.23	(0.03–1.55) 0.10  0.42	(0.02–6.88) 0.52 
Camels borrowed for breeding purposes§ 2.96	(0.87–11.42) 0.08  3.94	(1.45–12.32) 0.01 
 Herd-level borrowing of males 2.96	(0.87–11.42) 0.08  NR NR  
 Herd-level borrowing of females 2.45	(0.49–16.62) 0.30  NR NR 
Camels loaned for breeding NR NR  3.28	(1.19–10.44) 0.03 
Camels in herd are used for racing 0.49	(0.07–3.26) 0.44  0.89	(0.29–2.66) 0.83 
Camel is a racing camel† NR NR  0.37	(0.09–1.44) 0.15 
Water	source¶       
 Open ad lib Referent 0.13  Referent 0.15 
 Household only 1.89	(0.05–72.38)   2.81	(0.59–14.25)  
 Trough only 7.15 (0.95–70.49)   4.07	(1.01–18.88)  
 Spring  0.13	(0.01–0.98) 0.05  0.20	(0.04–0.80) 0.03 
 Irrigation reservoir 0.05 (0.00–0.91) 0.05  0.36	(0.06–2.22) 0.27 
 Tanker  1.24	(0.31–5.11) 0.75  0.77 (0.25–2.37) 0.64 
 Tap  0.82	(0.20–3.94) 0.78  0.99	(0.35–2.86) 0.99 
 Well	 0.57	(0.08–3.57) 0.54  0.44	(0.13–1.41) 0.16 
 Water	source	not	shared	with	herd,	household	use	only  0.30	(0.01–7.54) 0.45  0.96	(0.29–3.00) 0.94 
Closed	herd# NR NR  0.09 (0.01–0.39) <0.01 
*Variables reference the 1-year	period	before	sampling,	with	the	exception	of	herd	size,	camel	is	a	racing	camel,	and	a	priori	variables:	age,	sex,	and	
region.	Because	of	the	potential	influence	of	maternal	immunity,	camels	<6	m	of	age	have	been	excluded	from all variables except age. NR, not recorded. 
†Individual camel–level variables (all other variables being herd-level). 
‡Camels purchased are locally bred; Jordanian Ministry of Agriculture Camel Import Regulations and Conditions allow import only for live camels for 
direct slaughter. 
§In	the	2014–15 study, results for camels are borrowed for breeding purposes (male and/or female) and camels are borrowed for breeding purposes 
(male) were the same (i.e., all herds that borrowed camels for breeding borrowed males, and some of these herds also borrowed females). In the 2017–
18	study,	the	sex	of	camels	borrowed	or	loaned for breeding was not recorded. 
¶Open ad lib indicates irrigation reservoir or spring water sources were used; household only indicates water source was not shared between household 
and herd; trough only indicates only tanker, tap, or well sources were used. 




for breeding purposes, water source, and closed 
herd status (Table 4). Evidence of an association 
was noted between camel MERS-CoV seropositiv-
ity and drinking from water trough sources only, 
as compared with open ad lib sources (aOR 9.48 
[95% CI 1.54–58.24]; p = 0.05); borrowing camels for 
breeding purposes (aOR 5.07 [95% CI 1.37–18.75]; p 
= 0.02); location in Ma’an region (aOR 3.83 [95% CI 
1.01–14.51]; p = 0.05); and increasing age per year 
(aOR 1.60 [95% CI 1.34–1.92]; p<0.01). We investi-
gated the variable of lending camels for breeding 
purposes in a separate model, in place of camels 
being borrowed for breeding purposes, but did not 
find evidence of a significant association with se-
ropositivity. The composite variable closed herd 
demonstrated evidence of a protective association 
with MERS-CoV seropositivity (aOR 0.08 [95% CI 
0.01–0.55]; p = 0.02) when included in a separate 
model adjusted for the same confounders, although 
excluding constituent variables for closed herd, 
borrowing, and lending for breeding purposes.
Discussion
Previous studies have described MERS-CoV sero-
prevalence among camel populations worldwide; 
however, substantial knowledge gaps remain, in 
particular with regard to factors associated with 
higher risk for infection, which might provide in-
sights into viral transmission routes between and 
within camel herds (16,17). Such knowledge is es-
sential if effective disease control strategies, such as 
targeted vaccination programs and camel manage-
ment interventions, are to be appropriately designed 
and implemented.
Our findings suggest that borrowing male camels 
for breeding might serve as a transmission route for 
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Table 3. Multivariate associations between potential risk factors and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus seropositivity in 
camel	populations,	southern	Jordan,	February	2014–December 2015* 
Variable A	priori	adjusted	OR	(95%	CI)† p value Fully adjusted OR (95%	CI)‡ p value 
Age, per y§ 1.21 (1.07—1.40) <0.01 1.24	(1.08—1.42) <0.01 
Male camels borrowed for breeding purposes 3.44	(1.09—12.25) 0.04 4.18	(1.45—12.09) 0.01 
Herd size     
 Increasing individual camel nos. 1.05 (1.01—1.09) <0.01 1.04	(1.01—1.08) 0.02 
Water	source¶     
 Open ad lib Referent 0.19 Referent 0.08 
 Household only 0.52 (0.01—21.39)  0.90 (0.05—16.46)  
 Trough only 4.02	(0.51—40.84)  4.74	(0.93—24.08)  
Region     
 Ma’an 0.56	(0.16—1.79) 0.33 0.37	(0.12—1.14) 0.08 
Sex§     
 F 1.35	(0.45—3.86) 0.58 1.12	(0.38—3.26) 0.84 
Number of camel herds within a 15-min drive    
 >20 2.24	(0.68—7.99) 0.18 – – 
*Variables reference the 1-year period before sampling, with the exception of herd	size,	camel	is	a	racing	camel,	and	a	priori	variables:	age,	sex,	and	
region.	Because	of	the	potential	influence	of	maternal	immunity,	camels	<6	m	of	age	have	been	excluded.	OR,	odds	ratio.  
†Adjusted	for	a	priori	variables:	age,	sex,	and	region. 
‡2014–2015 study was adjusted for a priori variables and number of camels nearby (within a 15 min drive). 
§Individual camel–level variables (all other variables being herd-level). 
¶Open ad lib indicates irrigation reservoir or spring water sources were used; household only indicates water source was not shared between household 
and herd; trough only indicates only tanker, tap, or well sources were used. 
 
Figure 3. Frequency distribution of camel herd sample Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus seroprevalence, southern Jordan, 
February	2014–December	2015	and	October	2017–October	2018.	A)	2014–2015	study;	B)	2017–2018	study
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MERS-CoV between infected and uninfected camel 
herds in Jordan. Both studies demonstrated that bor-
rowing camels for breeding was associated with an in-
crease in MERS-CoV seropositivity in receiving herds. 
In addition, the 2014–2015 study demonstrated that 
the borrowing of breeding males was a significant risk, 
whereas the borrowing of breeding females was not (we 
did not record sex of camels borrowed for breeding in 
2017–2018).
In Jordan, as in other countries in the region, 
many herd owners do not own a breeding male camel 
because of cost or ease of management; instead, they 
borrow stud bulls from neighboring herds or send 
breeding females to herds that have a bull. These 
practices serve to provide spatial connectivity be-
tween infected and uninfected herds; this effect is 
potentially compounded by the immunosuppressive 
stresses of transport and joining a new herd and by 
the effects of male rutting behavior, in which orona-
sal secretions are sprayed over, or close to, breeding 
females (25,26).
Given evidence for the potential risk posed by bor-
rowing breeding males, vaccination of male camels 
shared between herds for breeding could be priori-
tized when effective camel vaccines become avail-









managed herds, such as those in Jordan. In addition, 
despite the challenges of artificial insemination in ca-
melids, the introduction of an affordable artificial in-
semination service, where feasible, could mitigate the 
transmission of MERS-CoV between infected and un-
infected herds (27). Other potential control measures 
could be introducing rRT-PCR testing schemes using 
nasal swab samples before movement between herds 
and quarantining of positive animals (28). In view of 
the current understanding that MERS-CoV transmis-
sion in camels occurs primarily through upper respi-
ratory droplet, evidence for possible sexual transmis-
sion remains inconclusive, and further research is 
required (12,29).
Closed herd management practices were found 
to be significantly protective, offering a potential-
ly valuable tool in controlling MERS-CoV among 
camels; voluntary closed herd schemes are a pos-
sible route to achieving disease-free herds (30). 
Where such practices would be impractical, our 
findings suggest that quarantining animals before 
introduction to the herd offers a protective effect. 
On the basis of current evidence of viral shedding 
patterns in camels, quarantine periods of >2 weeks 
should be employed.
Increasing herd size was found to be associated 
with increased MERS-CoV seroprevalence; larger 
herds are thought to provide a greater host reservoir 
capable of sustaining viral transmission between in-
fected and uninfected animals (16,17). In addition, the 
use of water troughs within herds, as opposed to open 
ad lib water sources, was associated with increased 
herd seroprevalence (although only in the 2017–2018 
multivariate model when the variable borrowing for 
breeding was included). Although crowded troughs 
might be a potential route of viral transmission with-
in herds, further research is required (31).
As described in other studies, seroprevalence in-
creased significantly with age in both studies, likely 
associated with the increased probability of disease 
exposure over time and boosting of antibody levels 
by repeat infections (16,17). Results of the 2017–2018 
study strongly suggest the presence of maternally 
derived immunity among calves <6 months of age, 
which could have relevance for future vaccination 
strategies (18). This association was less evident in the 
2014–2015 study; however, only 9 camels <6 months 
of age were sampled in 2014–2015, compared with 
39 in 2017–2018. Associations between sex and sero-
positive status have been previously described, but 
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Table 4. Multivariate associations between potential risk factors and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus seropositivity in 
camel populations, southern Jordan, October 2017–October	2018 
Variable* A	priori	adjusted	OR	(95%	CI)† p value Fully	adjusted	OR	(95%	CI)‡ p value 
Age, per y§ 1.60	(1.35—1.99) <0.01 1.60	(1.34—1.92) <0.01 
Camels borrowed for breeding purposes 4.46	(1.29—21.68) 0.03 5.07	(1.37—18.75) 0.02 
Water	source¶     
 Open ad lib Referent 0.07 Referent 0.05 
 Household only 3.17	(0.44—25.78)  3.33	(0.51—21.71)  
 Trough only 7.93	(1.41—65.04)  9.48	(1.54—58.24)  
Region     
 Ma’an 3.28	(0.92—14.94) 0.08 3.83	(1.01—14.51) 0.05 
Herd size     
 Increasing individual camel nos. 1.02 (1.00—1.05) 0.05 1.00 (1.00—1.05) 0.10 
Sex§     
 F 1.70 (0.59—4.88) 0.32 1.38	(0.48—3.97) 0.54 
No. camel herds within a 15-min drive     
 >20 3.33	(0.77—17.53) 0.11 2.40	(0.53—10.84) 0.25 
Herd is kept together as single group 
throughout the year 
2.24	(0.61.	9.85) 0.23 – – 
Herd has contact with other local herds 2.34	(0.65—9.85) 0.19 – – 
Camel is a racing camel§ 0.73	(0.13—4.33) 0.72 – – 
Camels are lent for breeding purposes 2.39	(0.66—10.70) 0.19 – – 
Closed	herd# 0.07 (0.01—0.43) 0.01 0.08	(0.01—0.55) 0.02 
*Variables reference the 1-year	period	before	sampling,	with	the	exception	of	herd	size,	camel	is	a	racing	camel,	and	a	priori	variables:	age,	sex,	and	
region.	Because	of	the	potential	influence	of	maternal	immunity,	camels	<6	m	of	age	have	been	excluded.	 
†Adjusted for a priori	variables:	age,	sex, and region. 
‡2017–2018	study	was adjusted for a priori variables and number of camels nearby (within a 15 min drive), herd is kept as a single group throughout the 
year, herd has contact with other local herds, and camel is a racing camel. 
§Individual camel–level variables (all other variables being herd-level). 
¶Open ad lib indicates irrigation reservoir or spring water sources were used; household only indicates water source was not shared between household 
and herd; trough only indicates only tanker, tap, or well sources were used. 
#Closed	herd indicates herd	owners	answered	no	to	all	of	the	following	variables:	borrowing,	lending,	purchasing,	racing,	and	contact	with	local	or	distant 
herds (2017–2018	study	only,	missing	data	2014–2015). Because	of collinearity with constituent variables, the variable closed herd was included in a 
separate multivariate model from camels are borrowed for breeding purposes and camels are lent for breeding purposes. In this model, all variables listed 
continued to demonstrate significant association (p<0.05) with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus seropositivity, with the exception of water 
source	(p	=	0.07).  
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no significant associations were identified in either 
study (16,17,32).
The difference in adjusted seroprevalence ob-
served between studies (together with differences in 
regional associations with seropositivity) might be 
explained by several factors. Those factors include 
differences in sampling strategy (nonprobabilistic vs. 
probabilistic), an absence of sample collection during 
the 2017–2018 summer period (with seroprevalence 
highest in summer 2014–2015), and a possibly limited 
introduction of new MERS-CoV variants into the pop-
ulation between the study periods, with geographic 
spread over time (33). Importing of foreign camels 
into Jordan is strictly regulated by MoA and permit-
ted only for animals going directly to slaughter (34).
The first limitation of this study is that no na-
sal swab specimens tested positive for MERS-CoV 
RNA on rRT-PCR; evidence for potential viral trans-
mission routes were therefore suggestive instead of 
definitive. Possible explanations include the nar-
row window of nasal shedding reported in camels 
(<2 weeks) (12) and the low prevalence of nasal 
discharge observed, potentially reflecting a limited 
genetic diversity of MERS-CoV variants circulating 
among camels in Jordan with rapid seroconversion 
and clearance (35). Second, limited sample size re-
sulted in considerable uncertainty on strength of 
associations. Third, data at the level of individual 
camels, particularly regarding history of movement 
for purchase and breeding, were limited. Such data 
could have supported herd-level findings and iden-
tified camels potentially infected outside the herd 
(depending on duration of detectable antibodies) 
(36). Fourth, in detecting an association between se-
ropositivity and potential risk factors, assumptions 
were made regarding persistence of detectable anti-
bodies (>1 year), meaning that estimates of associa-
tion are potentially conservative (37,38).
In conclusion, borrowing male camels for breed-
ing and closed herd management practices were as-
sociated with MERS-CoV infection prevalence among 
camel populations in Jordan, suggesting possible use-
ful interventions to reduce transmission. In addition, 
older age, larger herd size, and use of water troughs 
within herds were also associated with seropositiv-
ity. In view of this finding, future MERS-CoV vacci-
nation strategies among camel populations in Jordan 
could potentially prioritize breeding males, which 
are likely to be shared between herds for breed-
ing purposes. In addition, several targeted man-
agement interventions should be considered: mea-
sures to reduce the number of camels, particularly 
males, shared between herds for breeding purposes 
(including, if feasible, introducing an affordable cam-
el artificial insemination service at a regional or na-
tional level); maintaining a closed herd where possi-
ble, including the potential for voluntary closed herd 
management schemes; and quarantine practices of >2 
weeks before introducing new animals to the herd. 
The implementation of such interventions among 
herds in Jordan and the wider region, alongside tar-
geted vaccination, could reduce the prevalence of 
MERS-CoV among camel populations and confer a 
vitally protective effect on human populations associ-
ated with these herds (39).
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